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Background on Political Situation of Belarus towards 2007: 
In Search of a New Vision 
  
 
1. Main stages in the development of a political regime 
in Belarus 
There are two stages in political development of Belarus. The 
first stage covered the period from 1994 through 2003. During 
this period the model of personal power was formed based on 
broad public support. The second stage began in 2003, when 
Lukashenka’s rating had greatly decreased.  
 
1.1. Formation of regime 
There are two types of post-soviet regimes. The first type 
provides for broad involvement of the elite into property redis-
tribution within the process of economic reforms. A political 
leader, who oversees the transformation of economy, is not 
concerned with maintaining his popularity among citizens. 
Common interests of the elite deny return to the previous sys-
tem and provide an active support for the leader. Typical ex-
amples of such regimes are Yeltsin’s Russia and Kuchma’s 
Ukraine. The second type provides for the broad public sup-
port for the leader. This excludes the elite from participation in 
the decision making process and a process of property redistri-
bution. A typical example of such regime was Turkmenistan 
before Turkmenbashi`s death. Each of these regimes has its 
own logic and institutional system that provides for a regime’s 
internal sustainability.   
 
Electoral pre-conditions.  The political regime in Belarus emerg-
ing in 1994 relied on support of the majority of the population. 
Citizens supported both the new President and his program. 
This led to the formation of a direct power regime “president - 
people”, in which other state institutions’ role became nominal. 
All political elites that defended their own interests became 
enemies of the regime and were eliminated from the political 
life, regardless of their ideology (both the Right and the Left). 
The first step in this process was the liquidation of Parliament 
and alteration of the Constitution in 1996. Then, during the fol-
lowing several years, the control was established over all major 
financial streams in the country, i.e. control over large, by Bela-
rusian standards, private business. These actions deprived the 
political opposition of their internal finance resources. Presiden-
tial elections in 2001 ended the process of liquidation of the 
political environment in the country. Right after the elections 
the state machinery was reorganized, and as a result, influence 
of internal political groups in the government and presidential 
administration were limited. The opposition was forced out to 
deal with human rights issues only. Limited broadcasting of 
Russian TV channels led to the establishment of control over 
mass media. In such circumstances the President remained the 
only recipient of so-called political “rent” (credit).   
 
The political program that had received support from the Bela-
rusian people was based on two main theses:   
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• Social and economic stability ensured through preservation 
of big enterprises, high level of employment, absence of privati-
zation and reestablishment of state economy regulation. This 
approach was always presented as an alternative one to Rus-
sian economic reforms that according to Belarusian authorities 
led to economic chaos and social tension; 
• Union with Russia as one of the sources of economic reno-
vation and one of the slogans that was obviously broadly sup-
ported by the Belarusian population. There is an assumption 
that one of the motivating forces of integration policy was Lu-
kashenka’s own political ambitions towards Russian political 
environment.  
 
Economic pre-conditions. Belarus economic success in the mid-
90s   was mainly based on “Soviet heritage”: there was a 
strong and unique means of production with dominating indus-
try export orientation. In circumstances of industrial crisis in 
mid-90s in Russia, Belarusian enterprises were successful in 
exporting their products to the country. Another factor of 
growth in 1996-1998 was a special relationship with Russia: 
signed agreement on unified customs space, debt amortization 
for energy transmitters, low prices for gas imported to Belarus. 
The Russian financial crisis in mid 90ies revealed several weak-
nesses of macroeconomic policy based on enterprises’ funding 
at the expense of credit expansion and soft budget constrains. 
However, the crisis was overcome partially through the revision 
of internal economic policy, but mainly because of renewed 
economic growth in Russia. 
Thus, by the end of 2001, political regime was established in 
Belarus that was based on a set of main elements, including: 
1. Granted Russian subsidies for Belarusian economy (both 
directly and indirectly) gave Belarusian authorities resources 
needed for the implementation of announced social and eco-
nomic policy; 
2. Social and economic stability in the society provided for sup-
port of the Belarusian president by the majority of population; 
3. Lukashenka relied on support of the majority of the popula-
tion, which allowed him to concentrate all politics in his own 
hands, depriving state machinery and other political elites of 
access to it.  
 
1.2 Crisis of the political system 
In 2003 all elements of the political regime in Belarus faced 
new challenges. 
Challenge 1: Lukashenka’s rating decrease. From the moment 
of election Lukashenka’s rating was about 40%-50%, i.e. he 
enjoyed support from the population of Belarus. In spring 2004 
his rating reached its minimal level (according to different sur-
veys, his rating dropped to 14 – 19 %)  This sharp decrease of 
Lukashenka’s rating called his monopoly right to receive political 
credit in question, mainly from the state machinery that was 
itself interested in an access to the redistribution of property in 
the country. 
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In the summer of 2003, different groups in existing administra-
tion made an attempt to exert pressure on authorities. This 
struggle resulted in a number of arrests of businesspeople inte-
grated with authorities and several projects aimed at partial 
liberalization of the economy. Lukashenka faced with the di-
lemma: either to get back people’s support or to form another 
regime letting state machinery to participate in property redis-
tribution.  
 
Lukashenka’s personal qualities and his style of political leader-
ship stimulated him in looking for the ways of his rating in-
crease. Set of instruments in this case was very limited. Social 
and economic tools that could be used just during the election 
campaigns as the resources that could provide for a long-term 
rise of the quality of life of the population were absent. There-
fore, an attempt was made to use instruments of nationalism 
that appeared as anti-Russian rhetoric. Gas conflict in 2003 was 
used for Lukashenka’s electoral support increase. However, the 
possibilities of using nationalism as a political instrument were 
constrained by the former policy concept and Lukashenka’s own 
views. Therefore, the status of nomenclature began to change. 
Officials’ salaries were increased along with the salaries of di-
rectors of state enterprises; anticorruption policy was softened.     
 
Challenge 2: relationship with Russia. Because of the changes 
in Russia, the implementation of the former integration plan 
lost its sense. Main elements of this project for the Belarusian 
side were Lukashenka’s political leadership and transfer of Bela-
rusian political and economic model into Russia. If the integra-
tion process had been continued, it would have brought Rus-
sian private business in Belarus. This could cause dismantling of 
main finance streams’ control system and give the opposition 
internal sources of funding. All this forced Belarusian authorities 
to refuse the old political project “Leadership in Integration” 
and start forming new political project, “National Leadership”. 
Integrative rhetoric gave in to undertaking the role of the 
president in confrontation with artful and guileful “near and 
distant” neighbors. Undoubtedly, patriotism in political commu-
nication could increase Lukashenka’s rating. During the period 
of active anti-Russian rhetoric it rose up to 30%. However, the 
attempts in this direction were not very inspiring. Lukashenka 
was not able to decisively raise the “flag of nationalism”. Politi-
cal experience and existing cadres were an internal constrains 
of this action. Search for ideological grounding of the new pol-
icy resulted in conception, according to which Belarusians are 
the best Russians and Slavic people who remained faithful to 
traditional Slavic values unlike the other Slavic people who sell 
themselves to foreign cultures. This message to the electorate 
doesn’t sound really inspiring for any of the social groups. Apart 
from the ideological rhetoric, broken integration agreements 
between two countries, the new standpoint of Belarusian au-
thorities was reflected in purposeful prohibition of various Rus-
sian business initiatives in Belarus.  
 
 
Political and business cycle in Belarus 
Events Measures  
Referendum  
May 14, 19951  
Salary: 160% – May 1995, 188%  – 
June 19954 
Referendum   
November 24, 
19962  
Salary:  one month after the refer-
endum salary was increased     
Debts: September 1996 – 24%, Oc-
tober 1996 – 6.5%5 
Presidential Elec-
tions   
September 9, 2001
Salary: -36% – 1999, 
44% – 2000, 58% – January-August
2001 
Target point: 100 US dollars by the 
time of elections   
Debts: August 2000 – 17% of sal-
ary-fund, September 2000 – August 
2001 – 2.4% of salary-fund (August 
2001 – 0.5% of salary-fund).  
After the elections – has increased 
by 15 times    
Referendum   
October 17, 20043
Salary: 28.6, 40.5 and 43.5% – 
October, November and December   
2004    
Target point: 200 US dollars till the 
end of 2004 , 250 US dollars till the 
end of 2005  
Debts: since 2003 virtually none-
existing   
Presidential elec-
tions  
March 19, 2006   
Salary: has not increased less then   
30%  during last two years   
Target point: 300 US dollars till the 
end of 2006  
Comment. 1 – national symbolic was changed, integration with 
Russia, land reform; 2 – president’s authorities broadening; 3 – 
cancellation of the limit on the number of presidential terms for 
one person; 4 – growth speed; 5 – arrears of wages measured 
in % of salary-fund. 
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The main problem for Belarus within the new configuration of 
relationship with Russia was a threat of Russia cutting down 
subsidies for the Belarusian economy. First of all this threat was 
related to the shortening of direct preferences reflected in un-
derstated prices for energy transmitters and direct finance sup-
port for Belarusian government. One more element of “Russian 
challenge” was Russia’s economy dynamics that was doubting 
effectiveness of the selected model of Belarus social and eco-
nomic development. This deprived Lukashenka of an important 
ideological instrument that provided him support of a consider-
able part of population. 
 
Challenge 3: state of economy. Official propaganda was always 
underlining advantages of the Belarusian social and economic 
model in comparison with those of CIS countries, most of all – 
Russia. In response to ideological challenges of the successful 
Russian economy a new plan was designed for Belarusian eco-
nomic development: starting from 2004 the government faced 
new objectives – to provide for 8-9% increase in the Belarusian 
economy; to reach the level of $250 for average salary by the 
end of 2005. In order to reach these objectives two sets of 
measures were offered. From the one side, state control over 
the state and former state enterprises was increased (there 
were just 80 enterprises that belonged to state property and 
were reorganized into open joint stock companies in which the 
state has no interest). These measures could be effective be-
cause in the absence of concentrated owners management of 
the company is practically entitled to complete and unsuper-
vised use of the company’s resources. There are very limited 
chances to an increase the managements’ share on such enter-
prises that leads to extremely ineffective forms of internal cor-
ruption in management. Therefore, toughening of state control 
at some point increased effectiveness of such enterprises. Eve-
rything mentioned above is true for state-owned enterprises. 
 
On the other side, the government took the measures aimed at 
private sector support: certain liberalization of institutional con-
ditions of small and medium business, easing of private entre-
preneurs’ access to state owned investment resources (real 
property and equipment), broad participation of private busi-
ness in rural economy. Measures taken in order to liberalize 
private sector were contradictory and resembled those taken by 
socialistic governments in different countries of the Central and 
Western Europe. In 2003 the economy began to grow rapidly 
based on two factors: rise in world prices for oil products and 
growth of economy in Russia.    
World gas prices dynamics 
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Role of oil and other oil products in Belarus ex-
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2. Features of political development in 2004–2006  
 
On the eve of 2006 presidential elections, main trends of re-
gime’s development founded during the electoral crisis of 2003 
actively resurfaced. 
Policy towards opposition was toughened and independent 
mass media were almost liquidated, activities of NGOs were 
taken under tough control.   
 
The regime managed to re-established its electoral support, but 
of a different kind. Support of a charismatic Lukashenka de-
creased while support of the policy implemented in the country 
increased. This showed up, for example when many of those 
who voted for Lukashenka were unwilling to recognize that. In 
particular, private business support increased while support of 
those who traditionally voted for Lukashenka decreased.  
 
The project “National Leadership” had been developed and ac-
tive formation of ideological grounding for the project began. 
These developments resulted in a so called “state ideology”. 
Lukashenka’s last election campaign with a slogan “For Belarus” 
was a quintessence of this process.  
Nomenclature’s role began to increase in the economic decision 
making process, which in turn resulted in corruption growth in 
the society.  
 
External economic policy of the country was changed radically. 
In 2005 the European Union became the biggest export partner 
for Belarus. 
 
As previously the economy remains the real challenge. GDP 
growth (provided by high world prices for oil products) isn’t 
stable and is fully dependant on the current world situation. 
The threat of gas price increase is a great challenge for the 
Belarusian economy model and doubts its capability to adapt to 
external shocks. Single market orientation of the Belarusian 
export with a big share of Russian market VAT is another seri-
ous challenge.  Growth of the Russian economy and rise of 
population income in long-term period lead to Belarusian prod-
ucts sales slowdown (these products are mainly designated to 
the poorest part of the population). Moreover, economy’s 
growth in Russia attracts big international companies and leads 
to emergence of aggressive Russian companies, i.e. to competi-
tion increase. Belarusian enterprises have no experience of 
work in a highly competitive environment. 
 
For the first time since the Russian pressure has started in 1994 
to ensure participation of Russian business in the Belarusian 
economy has appeared in Lukashenka’s view as a real threat, 
as the implementation of these intentions would remove con-
siderable financial streams from the direct control. If Minsk 
does not want to return to the Union State project, it must look 
for alternative allies and liberalize economy at a certain point.  
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Changes of Russian gas price for selected NIS 
countries in 2006  
Country  Price in 2005, 
US dollars / 
1000 м3 
 Price in 2006,
US dollars / 
1000 м3 
Rate of 
growth, % 
Azerbaijan 60 140 133.3 
Armenia 54 110 (80)* 103.7 (49.2)
Belarus 47 47 0.0 
Georgia 62 110 77.4 
Moldova 80 110, 160** 37.5, 100.0 
Ukraine 50 230 (95)*** 360.0 (90.0)
* the price increased since 1st of April 2006. The price 
of gas for 1000 м3 is approximately 75–80 US dollars, 
considering agreements on Russian military equipment 
delivery to Armenia with reduced price 
** the price was raised twice:  since January 1 and July 
1, 2006. 
*** Gazprom sales gas (price 230 US dollars) to Joint 
Russian-Ukrainian Company “RosUkrEnergo” that sells 
gas to Ukraine - price 95 US dollars/1000 м3. 
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3. Conclusion: New opportunities emerged as a result of 
changes in the regime and society 
After the gas and oil disputes with Russia, for the first time, 
there are opportunities of a broad dialog in the society about 
the ways of development of the country. Changes in the re-
gime’s electoral support open up possibilities of building a dia-
log with different groups in the society. In order to build this 
dialog, implicit social contracts between authorities and social 
groups should be identified and development of appropriate 
alternatives starts. Belarusian authorities facing the new con-
figuration of economy and foreign policy, to some extent, be-
came more open to the dialog on economic and partly political 
issues.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
